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滚球, 以色列 , Palestine

As the world continues 成为 transfixed by the political soap opera unfolding in 滚球, perhaps none in the region have looked on more closely than the 以色列 is 和 Palestinians. While there is much that divides the 以色列 i 和 Palestinian leaderships, they share an enormous stake in the shape of 滚球’的未来,以及对他们迄今为止所见到的许多事情的不安。

对于以色列官员而言,霍斯尼·穆巴拉克(Hosni Mubarak)的倒台导致对以色列发动敌对的伊斯兰部队的崛起,以及南部边界安全真空的增加,这使人们对1979年滚球-以色列和平条约的长期持久性产生怀疑。穆巴拉克的沦陷和穆斯林兄弟会的崛起对于拉马拉的巴勒斯坦官员来说同样是麻烦的,因为它消灭了他们最强大的阿拉伯盟友,并鼓舞了他们在加沙的哈马斯竞争对手(哈马斯是兄弟会的分支)。穆斯林兄弟会的选举’穆罕默德·莫尔西(Mohammed Morsi)自60年前成立滚球共和国以来担任第一位民政总统,但加剧了特拉维夫和拉马拉的焦虑。

虽然说滚球到底是什么形状还为时过早’的外交政策将会采取,我们不太可能很快看到穆巴拉克继续实行宽松主义政策或滚球发生根本性转变’与以色列和巴勒斯坦人的往来。滚球的深刻变化’区域的态势可能是长期的,但将取决于许多内部和外部因素,包括当前正在进行的政治和经济改革的相对成功,美滚球关系的趋势以及以色列-巴勒斯坦阵线和以色列的发展。其他区域动态。尽管滚球与以色列和美国与滚球之间的关系不可避免地要降温,但是,如果以色列和美国能够认识到并利用现有但狭窄的条件,那么就阿拉伯与以色列的和平而言,未来的日子可能并非注定要失败关闭之前的窗口。

外交政策申诉

The virtual absence of anti-Israeli 和 anti-American slogans throughout the eighteen-day uprising in Tahrir Square is often cited reassuringly as evidence that the 滚球ian revolution was not about 以色列 or the United States. Such assertions are not entirely accurate, though. While popular rebellions are seldom propelled by foreign policy concerns, as opposed to domestic grievances, the 滚球ian uprising 和 the ensuing transition cannot be de-linked entirely from 以色列 和 the United States. The changes associated with 滚球’正在进行的政治过渡将对滚球产生深远影响’在今后几年中与两国的关系。

Support for Palestine 和 antagonism toward 以色列 are deeply ingrained in 滚球ian political culture 和 national consciousness. An issue that transcends partisan politics 和 commands broad national consensus across all ideological 和 demographic lines, the 巴勒斯坦事业 is as much a matter of identity as it is a question of public policy. Beyond sympathy for the plight of Palestinians, hostility toward 以色列 is also fueled by 滚球’自己过去的鲜血和宝贵的牺牲;与以色列的四次战争导致成千上万的滚球人死亡,数十亿美元的破坏。即使经过了三十年的正式和平,大多数滚球人仍然将以色列视为对国家安全的威胁,并且不仅是巴勒斯坦人而且是所有阿拉伯人的敌人。

The Mubarak regime did little to combat such sentiment. In fact, it frequently stoked populist antipathy toward 以色列 as a way to boost its own domestic legitimacy. In an environment where most forms of political expression were either severely curtailed or banned altogether, the regime generally tolerated anti-Israel 和 pro-Palestine activities, so long as they steered clear of criticism of the regime itself. This balancing act became increasingly untenable during the 2000s 和 the so-called “war on terror.”

In the decade after the September 11, 2001, attacks, Mubarak made 滚球 a cornerstone of two key pillars of American policy, U.S. counterterrorism efforts 和 the Arab-Israeli peace process—which by the close of the decade had become virtually interchangeable. Trilateral security coordination 和 intelligence sharing reached unprecedented levels following the victory of Hamas in the Palestinian Authority election in 2006. By making himself an indispensable asset to the United States 和 以色列 , however, Mubarak also fueled perceptions that his regime was little more than an extension of American 和 以色列 i policy.

以色列 ’s crackdown against the Palestinian uprising (the Al-Aqsa Intifada) that began in September 2000 和 the 2003 U.S.-led invasion of Iraq galvanized 滚球ians 和 other Arabs like rarely before. The proliferation of Palestine solidarity initiatives, anti-normalization 和 boycott campaigns against 以色列 和 mass demonstrations against 以色列 和 the United States steadily increased into the latter half of the decade in response to the 2006 Lebanon war, the Gaza blockade, 和 the 2009 Gaza war (Operation Cast Lead). This decade’的活动为像Kifaya这样的原始革命团体提供了训练场和灵感! (足够了!)运动和4月6日的青年运动。

Thus, somewhat ironically, Palestine activism became a sort of incubator for the protest movement that eventually led to the January 25, 2011, uprising. On one level, 滚球ians’ identification with Palestinian subjugation (and struggle for eventual liberation) was a vicarious expression of their own yearning for freedom. At the same time, pro-Palestinian activism along with anti-Israeli 和 anti-American sentiment in 滚球 became surrogates for anti-regime politics—体现了统治者与被统治者之间日益扩大的鸿沟。

美国期望穆巴拉克没有像大多数滚球人希望的那样,在以美国为首的和平进程中为巴勒斯坦人创造公平的竞争环境,而是期望穆巴拉克进一步向陷入困境的巴勒斯坦领导人施加压力,要求他们参加(失败的)谈判,并避免与哈马斯和解。但是,在以色列和巴勒斯坦的所有问题中,没有任何一个更普遍地不受欢迎或对穆巴拉克造成更大的破坏’比加沙的国内地位更高,这对已建立的反对派团体如“穆斯林兄弟会”以及新成立的抗议运动来说是一个集会号召。通过关闭滚球对加沙贸易,平民交通和人道主义通道的边界,穆巴拉克政权成为以色列对加沙地带和2009年加沙战争的封锁的同谋。

滚球’s historic peace treaty with 以色列 did more than just reconcile two former foes; it consummated 滚球’s strategic reorientation toward the United States. While Anwar Sadat may have signed the historic treaty, it was Mubarak who implemented it, preserved it, 和 made it a pillar of 滚球’在该地区的战略地位。正式地,穆巴拉克保持冷静’s length, 和 occasionally confrontational stance toward 以色列 , while quietly deepening security cooperation with Washington 和 Tel Aviv at all levels. Thus, despite the notoriously cold peace kept by Mubarak, 以色列 i leaders considered him a strategic prize.

公平地或不公平地,不可能将穆巴拉克分开’s growing unpopularity 和 waning domestic legitimacy from his relationships with the United States 和 with 以色列 . On one hand, much of Mubarak’s behavior in the region was seen as being at the behest of both countries. And on the other hand, the invaluable political, diplomatic, 和 especially military support provided by the United States (largely in response to 以色列 ’s needs) played no small role in sustaining the 滚球ian dictatorship.

以色列 , Palestine, 和 the ‘New’ 滚球

Pro-Palestinian 和 anti-Israel sentiment has continued to animate 滚球ian politics after the uprising. Anti-Israel protests are commonplace 和 Tahrir demonstrations regularly feature Palestinian flags 和 other symbols. 以色列 became a convenient punching bag for populist politicians from across the ideological spectrum, while 滚球ian presidential candidates competed over who was more pro-Palestinian.

Two events stand out as particularly noteworthy. The storming of the 以色列 i embassy in Cairo on September 9, 2011, by 滚球ian protesters angry at the killing of 滚球ian border guards during an 以色列 i operation against militants in the Sinai weeks earlier marked a turning point for all sides. The embassy attack, which prompted an emergency evacuation of the ambassador 和 his staff out of the country, was a signal to 以色列 is, Palestinians, 和 Americans alike that change was coming. The Muslim Brotherhood 和 other political parties condemned the embassy attack as an act of vigilantism unbecoming of a civilized state rather than for the sentiment behind it.

然后,2012年3月,滚球’第一届自由选举产生的议会一致投票驱逐以色列’大使在开罗,在滚球罕见地达成共识’臭名昭著的政治动荡,清楚地表明滚球在哪里’政治阶级相对于à对以色列为此,议员们还批准了一项案文,宣布:“革命的滚球永远不会是犹太复国主义实体的朋友,伙伴或盟友,我们认为这是滚球和阿拉伯国家的头号敌人,”并进一步敦促政府,“审查其所有关系并与该敌人保持一致。”尽管纯粹是象征性的,但鉴于议会’以色列在外交事务上缺乏权威,因此无法使以色列安心进行投票。

Despite the harsher tone coming out of Cairo, very little has actually changed in 滚球ian policy toward 以色列 和 the Palestinians since Mubarak’于2011年2月弹出。该国’s interim rulers, the Supreme Council for the Armed Forces (SCAF), have said they will uphold 滚球’s international obligations, including the treaty with 以色列 —as have most 滚球ian political parties, both secular 和 Islamist. 滚球 also continues to support the 以色列 i-Palestinian peace process (such as it is) 和 a two-state settlement of the conflict, 和 remains the primary backer of the Ramallah-based Palestinian Authority.

自穆巴拉克以来唯一出现的新发展’s removal have been 滚球’s brokering of a Fatah-Hamas reconciliation agreement in April 2011 和 the growing security vacuum in the Sinai, neither of which is irreversible. Even the highly unpopular closure of Gaza, despite some changes in the management of the Rafah border crossing, is largely the same as it was under Mubarak. 更多 crucially, 滚球ian-Israeli security coordination has continued throughout 滚球’尽管边界两边的紧张局势加剧,但政治动荡不安。

In fact, 滚球’s overall foreign policy orientation remains remarkably similar to what it was under Mubarak, including 滚球’与美国的紧密战略伙伴关系以及与沙特阿拉伯和其他海湾国家的合作(尽管后者’s open hostility toward the 滚球ian uprising). This should come as no surprise given that the military in general 和 the intelligence apparatus in particular have continued to control 滚球ian foreign 和 national security policy. Islamists have had little say in governing the country during the transition much less in formulating foreign policy.

也许是滚球起义带来的最根本的变化—这将是最难回滚的 —是舆论的重要性日益提高,而舆论如今已成为国内政治乃至政策制定中前所未有的力量。在整个过渡过程中,公众舆论的影响力显而易见。除了投票驱逐以色列大使,例如,有由SCAF安装了未经选举产生的政府所采取的民粹主义的立场,如决定拒绝国际货币基金组织(IMF)贷款和骚动对美国的非政府组织的释放工作人员。普通滚球人的态度很可能会对政客产生更大的影响,因为他们要向选民负责。

和平条约惯性

现在担任阿拉伯世界主席的伊斯兰主义者的统治地位’s most important country, could result in a reorientation of foreign policy in due course. But there are three reasons to expect more continuity than change in 滚球’未来几年的外交政策,无论谁掌权。

In the first place, 滚球ians are simply too consumed with domestic issues to pursue an ambitious foreign policy agenda at this time. Despite the supposed handover of power to an elected president on June 30, the country’湍流的过渡绝非完整。相反,选举高度分化的人物,如莫尔西和SCAF’坚持执政的大胆尝试表明,民主过渡充其量只是开始,而最坏的情况是无限期推迟。

同时,由于议会的命运和制宪程序的命运仍然悬而未决,滚球’军事,伊斯兰主义者和革命力量之间的三方权力斗争可能会持续一段时间。不断出现的民众动荡威胁和经济濒临崩溃的危险不断加剧,加剧了这种不确定性和持续的不稳定潜力。结果,外交政策问题将继续在经济和安全等国内问题上退居二线。像许多滚球革命未实现的愿望一样,滚球’作为该地区充满活力的行动者和阿拉伯世界领袖的重新崛起显然将需要等待。

滚球人之间无论在民众还是在政治上都没有重大意见分歧,这也有利于延续性。尽管滚球政治具有脆弱性,但在社会,政治和意识形态方面,人们对外交政策问题,特别是以色列和巴勒斯坦问题达成了相当广泛的共识。最近的几次民意测验还表明,尽管滚球人普遍对戴维营和平进程对滚球是正面还是负面有分歧,但主要政治力量仍然支持—包括伊斯兰主义者,民族主义者,左派和革命者—保持互惠和平衡的前提下,维护条约。滚球人希望在关系中看到的主要变化与西奈半岛的安全安排,向以色列的天然气销售以及以色列有关’巴勒斯坦人的整体待遇。

最后,在短期到中期,滚球对以色列/巴勒斯坦政策的最重要决定因素仍然是滚球的作用。’s military. SCAF’政治中的肌肉角色将持续一段时间。除了维护其巨大的经济利益外,执政的将军们一再寻求免于政府监督,预算审查甚至起诉的豁免,同时继续控制关键的政府职能。此类豁免是否最终被编入宪法,SCAF明确表示—最近是单方面的“宪法增编”—它试图保持对直接或间接影响滚球的地区的控制’的外交政策,包括国防,国家安全和情报,以及其他主权资产,例如司法和内政部。正是这一事实,更重要的是防止了对以色列人的部分全面爆发的恐慌,甚至是穆斯林兄弟会领导人的当选总统后的任何其他。

是的,戴维营,但有所变化

未来几年,滚球对以色列和巴勒斯坦的政策可能会集中在三个方面。首先,滚球将维持与以色列的和平条约,但最终将寻求某些调整—世俗组织和伊斯兰主义者大多数滚球政党都已经呼吁这样做。在这方面,最有可能的候选人与西奈半岛的地位有关,这是以色列人和滚球人都极为关切的问题。大卫营对滚球部队在西奈的部署能力施加了限制—由SCAF,伊斯兰主义者和世俗政治团体—冒犯滚球主权和民族自豪感。同时,人们长期以来担心以色列试图从人口和政治角度将加沙地带永久推到滚球。以色列人则担心,越来越多无法无天的西奈半岛正成为圣战极端分子南部武器和武器的避风港’走私到哈马斯控制的加沙。

滚球ian authorities acknowledge the security problems in Sinai 和 have recently begun to crack down on jihadi militants there, but are equally worried about the prospect of unilateral 以色列 i actions in the Sinai. Despite their shared concerns regarding the region, 以色列 i leaders are disinclined to consider changes to the peace treaty for fear of establishing a precedent. Even so, renegotiating aspects of the treaty could be in 以色列 ’的长期利益,不仅是为了解决关键的安全问题,而且也许更重要的是,使滚球’s current rulers—包括以前的反对派伊斯兰主义者—指导条约的利益相关者。

第二,滚球的政策很可能集中在和解巴勒斯坦派系上,而不是集中在‘peace process.’在滚球确实从事以色列-巴勒斯坦事务的程度上,它将限于其国家安全受到直接影响的地区。因此,我们很可能会减少对与以色列的谈判的重视,而更多地注重防止以巴暴力和促进巴勒斯坦内部和解。为此有实际和政治原因。显然没有进行任何有意义的和平谈判,已经导致许多有关方面将重点放在预防危机而不是解决冲突上。就滚球人而言,他们将更不会处理分散注意力的事情,更不用说东部边界的危机了。

即使是穆斯林兄弟会,可能会面临来自军事和愤怒的革命者的新压力,也将发现除了为巴勒斯坦的事业付出口头上的努力外,很难做更多的事情。—更不用说哈马斯了。尽管哈马斯仍然是兄弟会的最大受益者 ’如果取得成功,它目前的胜利感可能是短暂的。开罗旷日持久的艰难过渡将使整个滚球人,尤其是兄弟会更倾向于保持其东部边界的安静。更重要的是,尽管肯定有可能进一步放宽加沙地带的封闭,但哈马斯官员一直呼吁全面开放边界可能尚未实现。

兄弟会已经发出了朝这个方向前进的信号。尽管与哈马斯有着有机联系,但它对哈马斯采取了相对中立的立场’在过渡期间与法塔赫的仇恨。这可能是由于希望避免与SCAF以及与美国对抗,或者可能是为确立其作为未来对话者的信誉而进行的有计划的尝试的一部分。兄弟会’在军事政权,特别是滚球情报机构,在和解两个巴勒斯坦派系时起着更加平等的作用(或至少不那么明显地亲法塔赫),是中立之举。莫西总统在就职演说中不仅保证支持巴勒斯坦人的权利,而且明确表示,巴勒斯坦民族和解是巴勒斯坦人民恢复其领土和主权的先决条件。

加沙的平静要求在哈马斯-以色列轨道和哈马斯-法塔赫轨道上都进行政治安排。滚球与哈马斯和法塔赫之间达成和解的前景与以色列相处不佳,以色列认为哈马斯是恐怖组织,反对将其纳入巴勒斯坦治理。另一方面,以色列可以从滚球热衷于预防战争和遏制其东部边界冲突的事实中受益。这在滚球很明显’担任2012年3月加沙休战的经纪人,休战结束了以色列与巴勒斯坦激进分子之间的四天战斗,以及该交易结束了2012年5月巴勒斯坦囚犯可能爆发的大规模绝食抗议。

The fact that the Brotherhood may be inclined to push Hamas to reconcile with Fatah 和 maintain a ceasefire with 以色列 does not mean Hamas will necessarily comply. While the Brotherhood clearly has influence over its Islamist allies in Palestine, perhaps even inordinate sway, it is not in a position to issue orders to Hamas leaders either inside or outside Gaza. The willingness of Hamas to go along with 滚球ian preferences, however, may depend on what Morsi 和 the Brotherhood can deliver for Hamas politically. Since a total opening of the border is 不太可能 at this time, Hamas may seek the assistance of 滚球ian Islamists.

A third area of focus related to the 以色列 i-Palestinian conflict involves 滚球ian relations with the United States. Although the alliance will remain intact, tensions that began well before the 2011 uprising have accelerated throughout the transition. 滚球ian efforts to push for Palestinian unity or changes in the peace treaty with 以色列 could strain relations even further. Either way, security coordination with both the United States 和 以色列 is likely to continue in the coming years.

同时,美国与滚球之间保持着微妙的平衡’S ON一方面及其民选(因此到目前为止,主要的伊斯兰)的其他官员可能会更加复杂和不舒服在今后的岁月里成长军事统治者。双方不仅必须与仍然坚决反对任何美伊对话的国内选区抗衡,而且还必须轻率行事,以免疏远两国的政治行为者。这对于美国政府来说尤其困难,因为美国政府不仅必须在军事和伊斯兰总统之间,而且在这两个权力中心与更世俗的,自由主义的组织之间取得平衡。

期待

从长远来看,我们应该期望滚球与以色列和巴勒斯坦人打交道会发生更深刻的变化,尽管要花时间让公众的情绪与政府政策之间的差距缩小。当然,这是假定某种民主过渡仍在发生—绝对不能保证,特别是考虑到最近的事态发展,但这也不是完全排除的。在任何情况下,只要确实发生这种移位,就很可能涉及从两端向中间的移动。换句话说,我们可以期望看到舆论和政府政策同时发生逐渐变化,而不是彼此之间突然发生急剧变化。

穆斯林兄弟会和极端保守的萨拉菲斯都表现出了妥协的能力,特别是前者。实际上,兄弟会’在过渡期间,有关以色列和巴勒斯坦人的论述经历了重大转变—甚至在它赢得议会多数之前。兄弟会的大修 ’2010年至2011年的选举方案尤其引人注目。鉴于这两个程序均包含对“Zionist enemy,”新成立的自由与正义党(FJP)的2011年计划更加温和,删除了对以色列的最具煽动性的提及,例如“阿克萨清真寺的强奸犯,”并删除了“Palestinian cause”共。即使是反封锁语言也被大量淡化,以至于它甚至不再提到加沙的名字。

Whether such changes are indicative of a genuine political evolution or are merely cosmetic 和 tactical, only time will tell. 更多 importantly, the evolution of 滚球ian policy toward 以色列 /Palestine, over say the next five to twenty years, will depend on numerous factors, including the results of 滚球’s economic reform.

军队在政治领域的参与程度以及最终可能得到缓解的方式肯定会影响滚球’s long-term posture toward 以色列 /Palestine. Having already witnessed a major set-back in the transition to democratic civilian rule, the prospects for pushing the military from politics in the near future are not promising, though not impossible further down the road. While continued military rule may seem good for 以色列 in the short-term, it is ultimately unsustainable. Although a civilian-led government will undoubtedly reflect anti-Israel populism as a factor, it is also more likely to pursue a rational course of action.

The success or failure of 滚球’s economic recovery will also affect future relations with 以色列 和 Palestine, which of course is also bound up with its own interminable transition. Economic improvement will afford 滚球 the space to play a more active diplomatic role in the region 和 beyond, 和 could reduce its overall dependence on U.S./Western 和 Saudi/Gulf assistance. On the other hand, continued economic hardship will prolong 滚球’的外交停滞,也许还会进一步煽动民粹主义和仇外心理。

滚球’s posture in regard to 以色列 /Palestine will of course also depend on the future of U.S.-Egypt relations. Despite recent strains, 和 growing calls in both Washington 和 Cairo for phasing out the strategic partnership, the alliance is likely to continue for the foreseeable future. Over time, however, irrespective of who rules 滚球 or which party comes to power, 滚球ian foreign policy is likely 成为come more independent 和 more assertive, making some sort of parting of the ways inevitable. In which case, it would be reasonable to expect the military-military aspect of U.S.-Egyptian ties 成为 the last to go.

穆斯林兄弟会(或可能从中产生的任何继任者运动或政党)和其他伊斯兰力量的政治发展,包括在外交领域,可能会长期持续下去。但是,这在很大程度上取决于滚球的成败’的民主试验以及西方和以色列对伊斯兰教成功的回应。由于民主的后退可能对伊斯兰主义者产生不成比例的影响(与最近解散议会一样),因此,比起其他政治趋势,恢复专制或延长军事统治可能使他们更加激进。同样,在过去十年中,美国恢复了对伊斯兰主义的敌意,或者以色列言辞的升级,如总理本杰明·内塔尼亚胡(Benjamin Netanyahu)’提到伊斯兰是“贪得无厌的鳄鱼,”只能助长反美和反以色列的情绪。

最后,以巴战线的事态发展也将有助于塑造滚球 ’对此事的看法。在全面解决冲突方面继续缺乏进展可能会加剧滚球人在公众和政治层面对美国和以色列的反感和不信任。此外,恢复大规模的以色列-巴勒斯坦暴力,特别是如果它牵涉到大量巴勒斯坦人的伤亡,将会激怒公众情绪,并给滚球政治人物施加压力,要求他们做出回应。这种情况甚至可能重新巩固军事统治(也许是美国/西方的默许),削弱经济复苏,并激化滚球政治阶层的大部分。尽管即使是最公正的以巴和平协议也不会迫使滚球人爱以色列或以色列人,但这将有助于遏制日益增长的敌对甚至仇恨之源,并恢复滚球对美国的信任。

和平的机会?

The 以色列 i-Palestinian peace process had stagnated well before the dramatic Arab Spring. With the exception of a brief period in the final year of the George W. Bush administration, no serious negotiations have taken place between the parties throughout the preceding decade. The loss of Mubarak 和 the rapid rise of Islamists in 滚球 和 elsewhere have made a negotiated settlement less appealing to Netanyahu 和 more urgent for Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas.

尽管滚球的伊斯兰总统,以色列的强硬政府和巴勒斯坦领导人的分裂似乎不像是外交突破的要素,尤其是在美国影响力下降和该地区普遍动荡的背景下,但不必完全预言负。这个概念不是基于对当前现实的乐观理解,而是基于对未来可能性的现实看法。就是说,如果从以色列的角度来看,今天该地区情况糟糕,就没有理由相信,即使情况稳定下来,将来的情况也会好转。这样的阅读应该激励人们更认真地探索存在的可能性。

虽然莫西’选举几乎不代表伊斯兰项目的任务,伊斯兰主义者很可能在一段时间内仍将是滚球政治的主要参与者。不管他的伊斯兰意识形态如何,现任总统’外交政策,特别是以色列和巴勒斯坦的外交政策,与滚球主流社会的看法完全一致。无论如何,不​​管谁当权(再次假设没有实现民主过渡),滚球的政策可能对公众舆论的反应会更多,而不是更少。同样,随着滚球在政治和经济上随着时间的推移稳定下来,它对外国交战的参与可能会增加而不是减少,最终军事力量将从其政治角色中放松。该地区其他地方的趋势也不支持以色列拖延与巴勒斯坦人和平解决。例如,在阿萨德(Assad)后的叙利亚,任何未来的政治格局都可能包括来自叙利亚穆斯林兄弟会的强大队伍,叙利亚穆斯林兄弟会已经成为该国的主要力量’的反对运动。

None of this is to say that a Palestinian-Israeli breakthrough is imminent or even likely, only that initiating a credible peace process between Palestinians 和 以色列 is is possible even under present conditions. Any serious initiative on this front, however, would require substantial political will 和 investment on the part of the United States as well as a modicum of stability in 滚球’的过渡。尽管目前都不存在这两种情况,但是在2012年底或2013年初可能会出现一种或两种情况并非不可想象。

至少,目前的分歧为美国及其国际和区域合作伙伴提供了一个机会,重新考虑对阿拉伯-以色列建立和平的严重缺陷和严重过时的做法。这将需要超越依赖四方的失败机制的意愿。—由美国,欧盟,俄罗斯和联合国组成的调解集团—并且认识到包括滚球在内的区域性参与者应发挥领导作用而不是辅助作用。更重要的是,这还将要求美国和以色列不仅适应滚球,而且适应巴勒斯坦的新现实。在没有巴勒斯坦团结的情况下可以达成有意义的和平协议的想法始终令人质疑。然而,在阿拉伯之春之后,这是完全站不住脚的。

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